PLAN OF ACTION
PROPOSED BY FRANCE
TO THE COALITION
MEMORANDUM LAID BEFORE THE SECOND ALLIED MILITARY CONFERENCE
AT CHANTILLY, 6TH DECEMBER 1915 (Translation)
After the comparative failure of the operations against France and
Russia, Germany, covered in the West by her main Armies and a powerful
defensive system, and on the Russian front by similar dispositions of
less strength, is employing in the East such forces as she still has
at her disposal.
The aims of the enemy in this new phase of the war are easy to understand:
- To husband his resources in men, and by slowing down the process
of attrition, to be in a condition to continue the struggle indefinitely
: a policy made possible by the intervention of new allies, and by
the intensive employment of those he already possesses.
In attracting its forces to secondary theatres by threats at particularly
vulnerable points, to decentralize the efforts of the Coalition.
- To pursue the realization of the German imperial idea contained
in the phrase "Drang nach Osten" so as to increase
his world prestige, raise the morale of his own people, and acquire
so strong a position in the East that, whatever the issue of the struggle,
he could not be forced to surrender it.
If we adopt the least favourable view, the war may last long enough
to enable Germany to realize this plan, the success of which would give
her considerable moral and material advantages, constituting an insurance
against final defeat.
To oppose Germany's aims we consider that the Coalition ought:
- Pursue its principal objective : the destruction of the German and
Austrian Armies.
- Foil Germany's attempt at imperial domination in the East.
1. Principal Objective
There must be no indecision regarding the means by which the first
of these objectives is to be achieved.
The Allied armies ought to resume the general offensive on the Franco-British,
Italian and Russian fronts as soon as they are in a state to do so.
All the efforts of the Coalition must be exerted in the preparation
and execution of this decisive action, which will only produce its full
effect as a co-ordination of offensives.
It must be borne in mind that an offensive by our troops in France
would now be a very considerable undertaking, owing to the large forces
of the enemy opposed to us. This operation would be facilitated if a
Russian attack in force caused the Germans to move troops from the Western
Front.
Conversely, if Franco-British demonstrations, judiciously carried out,
succeed in pinning to their ground the whole of the forces opposed to
us, the field will be clear for the reorganized Russian Armies.
Suppose, on the other hand, that there is no co-ordination of effort.
In the present situation the Germans are able to add 10 divisions, no
longer required in Serbia, to their forces in reserve--about 12 divisions--on
the French front. Combined with the troops which could with safety be
withdrawn from the Russian front, a mass of 25 to 30 divisions could
be assembled. If the enemy is permitted to carry out these movements,
he will employ this force, acting on interior lines, on each front in
succession.
We consider that, to be successful, our offensive should take place
at almost the same time on both fronts--a few weeks hence.
On this point we ask the opinions of the members of the Conference.
When they resume the offensive the Allied Armies will have to overcome
the difficult problem of breaking through the fortified positions which
confront them on both fronts. This problem is not the same in both cases.
On the Western Front the enemy has developed and strengthened for more
than a year past the strongest possible defensive system, held by very
strong forces (110 divisions, all German). In Russia he occupies lines
of vast extent, weakly held, which are probably not so strong owing
to lack of time and means to make them so.
In these conditions, it seems that a breach in the German lines on
the Russian front could now be easily converted into a strategic "break-through",
leading to the disorganization and retreat of the enemy Armies.
From what we know of the conditions of the Allied Armies, they are
not ready now to undertake the co-ordinated action which we judge necessary
in order to bring about a decision.
It is therefore necessary for each of the Powers to combine their means
and increase their resources, pursuing meanwhile an energetic policy
of wearing down the opposing forces.
In conclusion, so far as the principal theatres of war are concerned,
the Allies must adopt the following policy until such time as it is
possible to launch the combined offensive.
Great Britain, Italy and Russia should use every endeavour to wear
down their opponents. France will co-operate so far as her resources
in man power permit.
France, Great Britain and Italy should complete their organization
and equipment and also supply Russia with the material she lacks, so
that the Russian Armies may be raised to their full offensive value
as soon as possible.
2. Secondary Objectives
For a long time the Quadruple Entente has realized that in its own
interest Germany's policy of Eastern domination must be checked. It
has therefore endeavoured to bar the way to German expanision in the
East.
(a) The first attempt was made on Constantinople itself, and success
would have had important results, detaching Turkey from the Central
Empires. At all events, the latter would have found themselves unable
to develop their Eastern policy.
Unfortunately the expedition did not achieve the hoped-for result.
We can only admit the failure and the impossibility of making a further
effort in that direction.
(b)The second attempt was made in the Balkan peninsula, and is in course
of execution.
Hesitations and delays have resulted in a situation much less favourable
to the Quadruple Entente than would have resulted from more decisive
action.
The Serbian Army has been driven into the mountains of Montenegro and
Albania, and our expeditionary force has begun to retreat towards the
Greek frontier.
Faced by this momentary failure, ought we to consider the game lost,
give up the plan and abandon Salonika? This solution should be rejected
for the following reasons:
1. The diversity of interests involved may lead at any moment to a
change of the Balkan situation in our favour. We must be in a position
to profit by it.
As regards Greece, the presence of our expeditionary force, combined
with the action of our fleet, constitutes a powerful influence which
has already had a salutary effect. So long as we maintain ourselves
in Greek territory, we shall be able to take advantage of the changes
in the political situation of that country, and perhaps to overcome
her pusillanimity.
As for Rumania, Germany has begun to bring great pressure to bear on
her with a view to securing her economic, and perhaps military, support.
Encouraged by our presence in Salonika, and by the concentration of
the Russian Army in Bessarabia, Rumania seems little disposed to yield
to German demands. Indeed, there seems to be a revival of feeling in
our favour at Bucharest. It is expedient to study events in this quarter.
In order to keep Rumania detached from Germany, the Coalition must take
the appropriate economic measures which are examined in a special appendix.
It is for Russia to take military action, either by the direct support
of her Army in Bessarabia, or by vigorous attacks upon the Austrians
in Galicia; or even by a vigorous attack upon Bulgaria across Rumanian
territory.
It is obvious that the Franco-British forces at Salonika are advantageously
situated to facilitate Russian military action ; for, so long as Bulgaria
feels the threat of the Allies to her flank and rear, she will not be
able to engage all her forces against Rumania ; nor will a German winter
campaign against southern Russia be possible.
The field will remain open for secret diplomatic action to influence
Tzar Ferdinand, who, according to certain information, is impatient
of German tutelage.
3. (1) We are in favour
of increased Italian efforts on the Albanian coast. It ought to be possible
to reassemble the Serbian Army when it arrives on the Adriatic coast,
and to reorganize it.
4. Finally, we should prevent the Central Empires from controlling
Greece, either by force or persuasion, and so utilizing all the Greek
ports and islands as bases for the maintenance of submarines, which
would soon wrest from us our control of the Mediterranean Sea.
For all the above reasons the Quadruple Entente should remain in the
region of Salonika, and wait upon events, directing them, if possible,
to conform to its interests and ready to profit by them.
If, as a result of her consolidated position in southern Serbia, or
in Greece, and in Albania, the Quadruple Entente succeeds in attracting
to its side Rumania and Greece, there is no doubt that the Balkan situation
in the following spring would be most favourable, and would permit a
complete check to all German enterprises in the East.
On the contrary, if events do not take a favourable course, and if
the presence of our expeditionary force at Salonika becomes useless,
we shall have to go further afield in order to block the path of German
imperialism. At that moment, but only at that moment, we should evacuate
Salonika, and consider the opportunity of arresting enemy progress in
the direction of Egypt.
(c) In the present situation the presence of our forces at Salonika
is sufficient to bar the way to German enterprise in the East.
The Germans have displayed an intention to threaten Egypt, and, though
it is impossible to estimate the precise importance of this intention,
it must not be overlooked.
In any case, the Allies ought to take all necessary steps to counter
this threat. Egypt must be put in a proper state of defence and troops
sent there.
But we cannot disperse our forces in a series of divergent operations
without playing into the enemy's hands. In principle, the troops actually
in the East should suffice for this secondary theatre.
In order to ensure the defence of Egypt in an economical way, it will
be necessary to draw for troops upon one of our expeditionary forces
which, for the reasons indicated above, can only be that at Gallipoli.
Consequently, we foresee the evacuation of the peninsula and the transfer.
of the British troops there to Egypt.
Moreover, the situation of the expeditionary force at Gallipoli presents
no prospect of improvement. It may even become critical now that the
Turks are supplied by the Germans with munitions and material of all
kinds. The most experienced officers on the spot are of opinion that
evacuation will be forced upon us when the enemy makes a properly mounted
attack on our positions. It is better to bow to the inevitable and withdraw
our troops before they are closely invested. We propose, from this moment,
the total evacuation of the peninsula, to be carried out progressively.
The British forces on the peninsula will be sent to Egypt for rest
and reorganization.
The defence of Egypt will be assured by these troops, and by a powerful
defensive system to be organized immediately east of the Suez Canal.
To recapitulate, we propose that the Coalition adopt the following
plan:
A. In the Principal Theatres
1. Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia will deliver simultaneous
attacks with their maximum forces on their respective fronts as soon
as they are ready to do so and circumstances seem favourable. This is
our essential aim, the principal means by which we expect to force a
decision.
2. Until this can be done, the Austro-German forces will be worn down
by vigorous action, to be carried out principally by those powers which
still have reserves of man power. (Great Britain, Italy and Russia).
3. Each of the Powers will unceasingly continue to accumulate material
and equipment. Russia and Serbia will be helped by their Allies to reorganize
their armies in this respect.
B. In the Secondary Theatres
The Allies will allot to the secondary theatres only the minimum forces
required--in principle, those which are already in the East--and will
use them to bar the way to German expansion, conforming to the programme
given below. One commander-in-chief for all the Allied forces m the
East will be charged with its execution:
1. The Coalition will first try to establish in the Balkans the effective
barrier which they failed to form at Constantinople. With this object
it is necessary:
- To continue in occupation of the Salonika region, in default of
southern Serbia (Franco-British Expeditionary Force, remnants of Serbian
army).
- To occupy Albania in force (Italy), to reassemble and reorganize
the Serbian army.
- To continue pressure on Greece (France, Great Britain, Italy), in
order to obtain the maximum co-operation from her, and to organize
on her coasts operations against enemy submarines.
- To take economic and military action (Coalition and Russia) to keep
Rumania free from German control.
- To follow closely the trend of events in the Balkans and profit
by all opportunities to bring neutrals over to our side, and take
advantage of changes which are always possible in view of the diverse
interests at stake.
2. At the same time, the Coalition must provide for the adequate defence
of Egypt. With this object it is necessary
- To evacuate Gallipoli by degrees and send the British troops thus
relieved to Egypt for rest and reorganization.
- To create a strong defensive system east of the Suez Canal.
C. Economic War :
The economic war will be organized and carried out to its fullest extent,
the necessary steps being taken at once by common Allied agreement.
(1) No paragraph is numbered
2 in the original.