PAPER BY THE GENERAL STAFF ON
THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
16TH DECEMBER 1915
(Marked "Copy as revised on 17th December")

AN EXAMINATION
BY THE GENERAL STAFF
INTO THE FACTORS AFFECTING
THE CHOICE OF A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN;
TOGETHER WITH
A RECOMMENDATION AS TO
THE BEST PLAN TO ADOPT.

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The problem has been carefully studied in all its military aspects. As it would be impossible in a short paper to enter fully into all the complicated factors affecting the decision as to the best plan to adopt, the conclusions arrived at are compressed in this paper into the form of a brief summary of the main arguments and of the deductions drawn from them, followed by an outline of the course recommended.

SECTION 1.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
AS TO OFFENSIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE ALLIES.

1. The offensive power of the Austro-Germans is still a danger to be seriously reckoned with. From highest to lowest they are imbued with the offensive spirit and with the belief that the only way to victory lies in the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. If they cannot find an opening for a decisive blow at one time, they will strive to make an opening at a future time. They will never lose sight of that object and their plans will always be directed towards such a blow as will give promise of quick and decisive success. They will therefore seek to deliver it against a main force in a decisive theatre.

2. The excellent interior communications in the hands of the enemy facilitate the application of the system of war on which he relies. He can mass troops on any of his fronts and move them from one front to another far more rapidly and securely than we can.

3. Large Allied forces cannot be removed from existing fronts in France or Russia, to conduct a campaign elsewhere, without the enemy's knowledge. Consequently, with his superior communications, their removal to a new theatre would enable him either to launch an attack against the front so weakened, or to transfer an equivalent force from that front in ample time to meet the new attack.

If he should decide on the latter alternative, he could either attack our troops with superior numbers while they were in the early stages of developing the fresh attack, or he could take up a fortified position on our new line of advance, which position he could make practically as strong as the lines existing in France.

4. If the Allies were strong enough to hold the enemy fast on the existing main fronts and, without taking any considerable force from those fronts, to throw in a large new army against the Central powers elsewhere, the possibility of gaining an advantage by opening a new line of attack would be much increased, provided the transport of a large army to the point of attack were feasible. But it does not follow that, even then, it would be the wisest course. The transport of a great army by sea and its landing, deployment and advance would take so long that the attack could not be developed for months, whereas on the existing fronts the same causes of delay do not exist, and if a successful attack on these fronts is possible very much more rapid results might be gained.

5. There is no chance of any great new army being furnished by France, Russia or ourselves during the next six or eight months. France certainly cannot produce it, nor could England, in the time. Russia has the men but not the munitions for such numbers as would be required, and, so far as can be foreseen, such increase as she can produce will continue to be required on her present front. Nor could she transport a great army, even if available, to any point where it could be brought to bear on a new front, within any reasonable time, against the Central Powers.

England's power of transporting troops by sea, and of guarding sea routes, is also limited. Our trade is already seriously affected by the great number of ships taken up, and military calls upon our mercantile marine should, if possible, be decreased, rather than increased. With the ships at present available it would take many months for a great army to be transported by sea to some new theatre, and its maintenance there would present very serious difficulties.

6. So far as operations on any great scale against the armies of the Central Powers are concerned the possibilities open to the Allies are clearly much limited by the considerations stated above, while any offensive on a minor scale against the Central Powers, on an independent line of operations, would almost certainly lead to the detachment employed being held up, sooner or later, by an entrenched position, if not enveloped and destroyed.

7. There are, however, various possibilities to be considered besides those already mentioned. Several British divisions are available outside France. Italy has large forces. Roumania or Greece, or both, may yet join the Allies. The Montenegrins and the remnant of the Serbs are still in being. Out of all this material perhaps a formidable offensive could be built up without exceeding the capacity of our sea transport? These possibilities are discussed in the following paper, but before dealing with them the ground may be further cleared by considering here another point.

8. The arguments given so far refer to an offensive against the armies of the Central Powers, on a new and independent line of operations, which would certainly have no prospects of success unless very large forces were available. But we must also consider the possibility of an offensive on a new but not an independent line, and in close co-operation with larger forces. This might be within the power of the Allies without help from any States at present neutral.

If active co-operation with the Allies on the part of the Balkan States be excluded there are only three such possibilities open to us so long as Holland remains neutral, viz:

1. A landing on the Belgian coast, to co-operate with the left of the present main Allied line. This has been carefully considered, but it would amount really to part of a scheme for an offensive on the existing front, and not to an independent operation. We are, therefore, not concerned with it here.
2. A landing near the head of the Adriatic to co-operate with and assist an Italian advance across the Isonzo, and then move towards Buda Pesth.
      This presents undoubted attractions, but the sea transport and the maintenance of communications across the Adriatic would be very difficult and dangerous, while the landing and subsequent advance would also be so difficult that the chance of pushing far into Austria would be small.
      Nevertheless, even a limited measure of success might, by drawing in larger Austrian forces, afford valuable help to offensive operations elsewhere provided it could be gained without weakening the main offensive.
      If such an operation were decided on it would apparently be within the power of Italy to undertake it.
3. A landing in Asia Minor, in co-operation with a Russian advance in considerable force through the Caucasus, and also, perhaps, with a Russian landing on the southern shores of the Black Sea.

This last mentioned idea might be attractive to Russia, if she had the men to spare. Moreover, the plan suggested would cover our Eastern possessions. But its chances of any real success against the Turks would be slight unless large numbers of the Turkish forces had been removed well out of reach.

We should have to force a landing in Asia Minor--no easy task unless a complete surprise were gained. Even if we landed about Alexandretta (the point nearest to the Russians in the Caucasus) there would still be some 400 miles of difficult country between us and the Russians. Our army and that of the Russians would, therefore, have to fight their way forward independently to effect a junction. To do this, and to guard our base and line of communications, probably nothing short of a quarter of a million men on our side, and a somewhat similar number of Russians, would have any chance of success. To land and maintain in Asia Minor such a force, with the enormous mass of special transport required, would be an immense undertaking. The preparation of special land transport and equipment would be a long and costly matter. Then the sea transport to Asia Minor and the landing there would take many months, followed by lengthy operations before a junction could be effected. After that an advance of some hundreds of miles towards Constantinople would be necessary to secure decisive results, and strong lines of Turkish entrenchments would certainly have to be carried.

We should be fortunate if we gained decisive results within a year from now, and when we had gained them it would only be against the Turks. Meanwhile, including our troops and Russian troops, some half a million men, plus as many more at least as "wastage", would have been withdrawn from the war against Austro-Germany.

Without going into the naval difficulties involved, it is sufficiently evident that whatever else might be gained by such an operation it would not be likely to give decisive results against the Central powers; and that must be our primary object.

9. The views of the General Staff on the Dardanelles operations have already been so fully explained that it is not necessary here to do more than touch briefly on that question.

Success in opening the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would undoubtedly have a great, and a more or less immediate, effect, both direct and indirect, in the main theatre of war and on the Arab and Mahometan worlds. But the General Staff see no sufficient prospects of success at the Dardanelles, with the means now at our disposal, and in view of the lateness of the season, to justify any further offensive efforts there at present.

It is conceivable that conditions might become more favourable after the winter, but in view of various considerations already put forward in this paper, and those explained in subsequent paragraphs, the General Staff see no reason to modify the opinion expressed by them in their paper submitted on the 22nd November, 1915, that the drain on our resources involved in maintaining our positions in Gallipoli throughout the winter is too great for the means at our disposal and would weaken our future efforts to a serious degree.

10. The arguments given above have not entered into the possibilities of decisive success being gained next year by a great offensive in the main theatre. Before discussing that problem, it is advisable to consider the offensive moves open to our enemies, and the defensive measures which it is necessary or advisable for the Allies to take. These, as will appear, have considerable influence on the offensive possibilities open to us.

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SECTION 2.
GENERAL DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS, AND DEDUCTIONS THEREFROM AS TO THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS AVAILABLE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

11. It is certain that the Central Powers are not less anxious than the Entente Powers to find some means of ending the War victoriously in as short a time as possible.

Probably the quickest and most certain decision for the Central Powers would be found in a successful landing in England and the seizure of London, if the difficulties of transporting to our shores the comparatively small force required could be overcome.

Next to that the quickest results of a decisive nature would be gained by a great victory in France and the capture of Paris.

A third possibility of forcing a decision would lie in the complete defeat of the Russian Armies. But the great size of Russia, coupled with the comparative difficulty of communications in that country, and the absence of any centre on which the life of the country depends to the extent that we depend on London and France on Paris, might entail a far greater expenditure of time in bringing Russia to her knees than would be necessary for the over-running of England and France if their defences were once broken through.

Whatever the comparative attractions of a great offensive against England, France or Russia may be however, the point to note here is that, so long as it is possible for the Central Powers to mass great forces for such an offensive, it is impossible for any of the Entente Powers to weaken their defences to an extent which might result in their being broken through. The same argument applies also in the case of Italy.

12. It is calculated that the two Central Powers have from 4 1/2 to 5 millions of men in the field still, and that they can maintain those numbers for several months yet. Their excellent communications enable them to throw the weight of these great numbers from side to side, so long as the Allies are incapable of seriously threatening the territory of the Central Powers by a strong and simultaneous offensive. But the security of their own territories is as important to Germany and Austria as the security of their home territories is to the Allies. Therefore, though up to date the strength of the Allied attacks has proved insufficient to deprive the enemy of the power of moving reinforcements between east and west within the present main theatre of war, he cannot venture to detach largely to any great distance from that theatre so long as there is any serious danger of his home defences being broken through.

Thus, whatever offensive projects may appear worthy of consideration, defensive requirements render it certain that the main armies of all the belligerents will remain on the fronts now occupied; and owing to the more rapid power of movement of the enemy the Allies are, and will remain, even more tied down in this respect than the Central Powers are. This is generally true of France, Russia and Italy. The problem of the defence of the United Kingdom presents special considerations. A successful attack on England would promise so great and immediate a return for a comparatively small expenditure of force that the idea must have immense attraction for the enemy. He knows that on land our defence is weak, and a sufficient army, once landed, would be within a few marches of London. But to land, our Naval defence must be eluded or broken. In that difficulty alone lies the comparative security of England and our consequent ability to denude our shores of land forces to an extent that would otherwise be impossible.

But our power of disposing of the land forces thus made available is not unlimited. France is not strong enough to guard her own front securely without help which we alone can give. Even having regard to selfish motives alone, unless we are prepared to maintain a large garrison in England, we dare not risk seeing France over-run. The capture of the northern French Channel ports by the Germans, giving them a measure of control over the Straits of Dover, would suffice to add seriously to our Naval task and to increase the possibility of a German attempt against England. In the most literal sense, in fact, we are defending England in France, and although a strong Allied offensive in France would probably deprive the Germans of the power of detaching from there, a defensive attitude would not have that effect. The problem of Home Defence in the United Kingdom is too long and complicated to be entered on in detail in this paper. But from an examination of it, the General Staff are of opinion that if numbers in France were limited to what is necessary for a strict defensive, and allowing for Russia's offensive weakness, it would not be safe to leave the United Kingdom with a garrison of less than 4 regular divisions, fully armed and equipped, in addition to the Reserve units and the weak Territorial divisions at present available.

From a careful consideration of numbers and general conditions, the General Staff are of opinion that to secure France defensively the whole of the French Army, plus 28 British divisions (for the length of front we now hold), are required, unless, and until, Russia can bring far heavier pressure to bear on the East front than she will be able to do for several months from now.

13. Thus we arrive at 32 divisions as what we require in France and the United Kingdom--the four divisions allotted to the latter being in addition to the 13 Territorial divisions now there. If these Territorial divisions were brought up to, and maintained at, full strength and fully armed, equipped and trained, and were suitably distributed with a view especially to protecting London against attack from the east, the four Regular divisions could safely be released. But unless the problem of dealing effectively with the Territorial Divisions is promptly solved either by filling up their depleted ranks with men enlisted for general service for the period of the war, or by other means, there can be no question of their being brought up to strength for some months, if ever, owing to the heavy drain on account of drafts for divisions abroad.

14. If these 13 Territorial divisions were brought up to strength we should have available (in Europe and Egypt) 72 divisions in all, including the troops already furnished from the Oversea Dominions. This number includes an additional Canadian division, which it is intended to organize in England, and also a Territorial division which it is proposed to form out of detached units now in France. It also includes 2 New Army divisions at home which are still very incomplete and are unlikely to be fit to take the field before the spring. Without the 13 Territorial divisions we can therefore at present only dispose of 55 divisions, which will be increased to 59 later.

15. By abandoning entirely offensive operations in France and by allotting 32 divisions to France and to the United Kingdom we can therefore at present make available for service elsewhere a total of only 23 divisions (55-32).

Of these 23 divisions, two are just ready to take the field for the first time, and three more will become available to do so during the next 3 or 4 weeks.

Ten others are in Gallipoli, most of them so reduced in strength and general efficiency that, even if withdrawn, they will not recover their full fighting value before the early spring. Five more are in Salonika.

If we retain 5 divisions at Salonika and 4 (estimated to be necessary) at Helles we have 14 left. From these we have to provide for the defence of Egypt, for which 8 divisions are estimated to be required. Therefore, as matters stand, by taking up a passive role in France we should have 6 divisions which could be made available for operations elsewhere, and it is not impossible that developments at any time during the next few months may bring about a need to use some of these to strengthen our defences in Salonika, Egypt, France, Helles, or possibly India,

18. To summarise, for purely defensive purposes in Europe and Egypt we should require:

In the United Kingdom (in addition to 13 weak Territorial divisions)	4	divisions.
In France	28	"
In Egypt	8	"
In Helles	4	"
In Salonika (at Present)	5	"
Total	49	"

17. From the foregoing statement, assuming that we can bring up to strength and maintain in the field continuously a total of 59 divisions, at war strength, the number of troops available for an offensive in the spring, after providing for defensive requirements, depends on where that offensive is made.

If it is made in France we should have, on the above calculation:

28	divisions then there.
10	estimated as surplus to defensive requirements stated above (59 minus 49).
4	released from England by our offensive in France.
42

 

And if we withdrew from Salonika and Helles we could add another nine, while eight from Egypt, or some of them, might also be available. Moreover, on the assumption that a really strong offensive in France would secure England we could also put in some of the 13 Territorial Force divisions still in England, if they are maintained and brought up to strength.*

Thus the total force available for an offensive in France next year may be taken as a minimum of about 42 and a maximum of 59, or even more (if a few of the Territorial divisions in England could be taken), according to circumstances and to the policy that we adopt as regards the degree of risk to be accepted in secondary theatres of war.

For an offensive in the Balkans we should have, in spring:

provided we had not been obliged to reinforce France or India.

The calculation made for the Balkans would apply generally to any offensive in the Mediterranean.

18. We can look for no direct material assistance from France or Russia in any offensive outside the present main theatre of operations. The French can do little, if anything, outside the main front they are now holding, at any rate unless we take over more of the line there, which would proportionately reduce the estimates made above.

The Russians also, owing to lack of munitions, may be strained to their utmost power to hold their own main front if seriously attacked. At present, so far as can be ascertained, their armed strength in infantry is well under 1,000,000, and we cannot rely on their being able to operate with more than 1 1/2 millions in the spring and 2 millions in the summer.

19. The Italians, if willing, could probably spare a large force up to perhaps half a million--without abandoning entirely the offensive operations on the Austrian frontier now in progress, if such a force could be transported to any other theatre of war; but in view of their special interests, of their probable natural reluctance to uncover their own frontier, and of transport difficulties, it would not seem wise to calculate on more than an Italian detachment of perhaps 100,000 men, operating from the Adriatic, or perhaps in North Africa. Submarine difficulties might make even such operations very difficult.

20. The Serbs, according to French estimates, will have 250,000 men in the field next spring if the Allies can arm and equip them. The latter could only be done at the expense of Russia, and would reduce her strength proportionately. But, in any case, the General Staff are not prepared to accept the estimate mentioned. They consider that 100,000 is a maximum figure, and that we should calculate on the Serbs being available only in or near the Balkans and in co-operation with other Allied forces if any such are employed there. From the present trend of events it is even quite possible that neither Serbs nor Montenegrins will be available to co-operate in any appreciable numbers in future operations.

21. The only other possible sources of help are our Allies in the Far East, or some of the nations at present neutral. Assistance in Europe from Japan is outside the scope of this paper, as are speculations as to what Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, etc., may or may not do. We can certainly frame no plan now on any assumption of a change of attitude on the part of these neutral nations. The Balkan States at present neutral, however, cannot be ignored. Their geographical position and their attitude affect events in the main theatre of war so immediately, that they must be taken into account. It will be convenient to discuss this complicated problem in a separate section of this paper.

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SECTION 3.
THE BALKAN PROBLEM.

22. The attitude and course of action of the Balkan States requires consideration as regards probable effects, not only on events in the main theatre of war, but also on the Arab and Mahometan Worlds. The situation in the Balkans is so complex that future developments cannot be foreseen with any certainty, and, therefore, our plan of campaign--so far as Balkan influences are concerned--must be based mainly on assumption.

That being so, our wisest course undoubtedly is to adapt our plan to the most unfavourable conditions that it is reasonable to regard as possible. Having done that we shall be prepared to deal suitably with those conditions, while if things fall out more favourably we shall be so much to the good. To adopt the opposite course, viz., to base our actions on vague hopes of a favourable turn of events, would be to take grave risks of having to change our plans while in process of execution, a procedure which must always be dangerous and is generally disastrous.

23. We are certainly not justified in basing any plan now on a hope of active help from Greece. Behind her attitude of professed benevolent neutrality, symptoms of feelings which cannot be regarded as friendly have made themselves evident. We shall be on firmer ground if we act in future on the assumption that Greece will remain neutral if she can, until there is no longer room for reasonable doubt as to the results of the war, and that meanwhile if she has to yield to force she is even more afraid of the Central Powers than of the Entente. We are now in an entirely false position in Greece. We should be wrong to regard her territory as available as a base for present or future operations unless we are prepared to occupy by force such portion as we may require, and to guard it against possible attack by the Greeks. For this large forces would be required.

24. Serbia, in full possession of the enemy, is now hostile territory, and we should find it adequately garrisoned against any possible Allied operations. Its mountainous nature and lack of communications make it easy to defend, and it is within the power of the Central States to throw reinforcements quickly into Serbia if required there, and to withdraw these again to the main theatre at need.

Bulgaria, covering one flank of Serbia, is equally difficult to attack, and can be reinforced either by the Central Powers or by Turkey.

Albania, on the other flank of Serbia, is a difficult country to enter from the Adriatic (owing to the danger from Austrian submarines and the inadequacy of the harbours). It is practically impossible to pass through in great force, owing to natural difficulties and lack of communications. And it is peopled by a race, capable of being very troublesome in their own mountains, on whose friendship we are not justified in basing any plans.

Further north Montenegro is equally difficult to operate in; while north of Montenegro lies mountain territory, whose inhabitants, though in sympathy with the Entente, are powerless to assist us actively.

Thus we are shut off from the Central Powers, on their southern side, by a broad band of hostile or potentially hostile territory, extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and occupied practically from shore to shore by strong hostile armies which can rapidly be reinforced by the Central States should need arise.

The only really friendly and dependable spot to be looked for in this hostile belt is that in which the remnants of the Serb army may find refuge: they may find none, and even if they do they would require much assistance (some of which would have to be diverted from Russia) before they could take the field again.

25. Under such conditions an offensive through the Balkans, intended ultimately to reach and cross the Danube, would be a very formidable undertaking.

It would take months to equip the force suitably and to transport, land, and deploy it. Unless and until Greece actually joined us we should have to guard our base strongly. Then to fight our way to the Danube, even helped by Italians and Serbs from the Adriatic, would be costly and take considerable time. When we got to the Danube--having abandoned any offensive in France to do so--there is no reason to suppose that our further progress would be any easier than an advance in France.

It is very doubtful whether this great effort would induce Greece to join us. We can hardly suppose that it would induce Bulgaria or Turkey to change sides. They are much more likely to oppose our advance strongly. As to the chance of bringing Roumania in, it is only necessary to point out that if she can be coerced into joining the other side she will have been so coerced long before we could even have landed on the Aegean coast a sufficient force to commence our advance, and if she has not been coerced by then it would be convincing evidence of her future neutrality, if nothing better.

Without going more deeply into the question here, but after having considered it very fully, the General Staff are convinced that to employ our "surplus" divisions (vide paragraph 17) in the Balkans next spring and summer (and it could not be done sooner) would not only not promise any adequate results as against the Central Powers, but might very possibly ruin our chance of ultimate victory.

26. Can we then do nothing to lessen the chance of Roumania being coerced into joining the Central Powers? A great offensive in the Balkans is too slow and too dangerous an expedient to adopt. Minor defensive measures, or attempts at minor offensive operations in the Balkans are costly and useless. We have had enough experience of the results of such attempts to prove that. There is no more reason to suppose that a passive defence of Salonika and the retention of a certain number of Bulgarian divisions in masking it would have any more influence on Roumania than the presence of the British force at the Dardanelles had on Bulgaria, once the prospect of a successful advance on Constantinople had vanished. Nor could it in reality have any effect in preventing Bulgarians or Austrians operating at leisure in Montenegro or Albania, or in hampering German or Turkish plans in the East.

The plain truth is that the Allies are unable, at present, to prevent forcibly the coercion of Roumania and we only make matters worse by attempting it with inadequate forces. It is one of the penalties for general lack of preparation against an enemy who was fully prepared.

So far as military measures are concerned we must accept the chance of Roumania being coerced, and we must include in our plan of campaign the best measures we can devise to minimise the effects of her possible entry against us.

If she does join the Central Powers the direct effect in the main theatre of war will be to increase by 250 miles the front which Russia has to guard and to add appreciably to the numbers available to attack her. It will also improve very greatly the means of communication, lateral and rearward, by railway and river, enjoyed by the Central Powers, and even possibly put them into the position of disputing with Russia the command of the Black Sea. The best way to deal with such a situation will be suggested as part of the general plan to be proposed.

27. It is conceivable that failure on the part of the Allies to re-establish themselves in the Balkans may enable the Central Powers to use Bulgarian and Turkish troops, as well as Roumanians, in the main theatre of war. But, even if that be so, it will certainly be no worse for us in our struggle against the Central Powers to have to meet detachments of those troops in the main theatre of war than to involve ourselves against their main armies, in their own mountains, under conditions which, in some respects, would be decidedly more unfavourable to us. Moreover, it is at least as likely that the Bulgars will busy themselves in their newly occupied territory, and that the Turks will seek conquests eastward, as that either will help the Central Powers on their east or west fronts.

28. So far as the Balkans are concerned, therefore, the weight of argument is strongly in favour of the Allies trying to re-establish their influence in that region by first defeating the Central Powers, instead of seeking to re-establish themselves in the Balkans as a possible means of eventually defeating the Central Powers.

29. Turkey is likely to look for her reward eastward. We cannot prevent this by such operations as have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs; and, in previous papers, the arguments against the possibility of preventing it by operations in the Dardanelles during the winter have already been explained. We must therefore rely on other means. (See end of this paragraph.)

Various plans bearing on the Balkan problem have been discussed in papers already submitted by the General Staff, and for the reasons given therein it is still considered that our wisest and most economical course, on strategical grounds, is to defend Egypt from Egypt; to regard the Baghdad operations as secondary at present to the defeat of the Central Powers; and to rely on the present garrison of India for the defence of that country, with a reinforcement of some infantry if matters develop unfavourably there.

The "other means" referred to higher up in this paragraph are the resources of diplomacy.

Diplomatic measures are outside General Staff responsibilities, but as strategy and diplomacy should go hand in hand in war it may be permissible to offer a suggestion as to how the latter could render most effective help to the former.

Diplomacy can help strategy by realizing where strategical exigencies demand delay and where they demand quick decision, and by exerting its influence accordingly.

Probably the most effective help that diplomacy could give now would be to detach Turkey from the Central Powers and set her against Bulgaria. This, if it be possible, would relieve very considerably the tension in the East, and (if it could be done quickly) would also tend to enable Roumania to resist coercion.

We have many sympathisers in Turkey. We owe Bulgaria nothing. Germany is in Bulgaria's debt and she can reward Turkey--if at all--only by offering her a free hand eastwards. We have, therefore, a diplomatic advantage over Germany in this respect if we are free to use it, a point on which the General Staff are not qualified to offer any opinion.

The extent to which Russia would stand to lose by this depends apparently on whether there are sufficient grounds now for hope of such a victory as would enable the Entente to impose what terms it likes. If favourable terms could be offered to Turkey, Russia in common with all her Allies would gain enormously in the increased chance of victory if the bait were accepted, while if it were refused we should be no worse off. If a favourable offer to Turkey were made at once and accepted it might go a long way towards solving the Dardanelles problem, voluntary withdrawal from which would fit in with the plan.

The military advantages to be gained have emboldened the General Staff to put forward these suggestions for such consideration as they may be deemed worthy of from the diplomatic point of view.

30. Before turning to final considerations and formulating their recommendations the General Staff desire to touch briefly here on a few of the more important considerations which have been taken into full account in their examination of the problem, but which space does not admit of stating at length. The first of these is the limitation in the power of the Navy to transport and escort troops and the vast quantities of stores required for their maintenance; to open, administer and guard new bases; and to carry out all the multifarious duties devolving on them. The strain thrown on the Navy has been enormous, though not generally understood, partly through want of knowledge of what heavy and difficult work is involved, and partly owing to the great success with which that work has been carried through. But there is a limit, and it must be taken into account in plans of operations. There is some reason to think that we have already almost exceeded the limit in the number of transports withdrawn from other vital work.

A second point is the need for special equipment for special operations. It is indispensable. It is very costly. It takes a long time to procure and it is not always obtainable.

A third point is the uselessness and the danger of offensive operations undertaken in insufficient strength. In plans of operations the courses open to the enemy must be very fully considered and he must be credited with acting on sound lines. To attempt an offensive against him with insufficient strength is to invite disaster.

A final point is the inability of a pure defensive to do more than repulse attacks and gain time. So much it can do if in adequate strength and adequately prepared. But, unless a force on the defensive is so placed that it bars the enemy's road to his object, its effect on his freedom of action is negligible. He has merely to "contain" it, which can generally be done by inferior forces, and in certain circumstances he may be able to neglect it altogether. It is only when the enemy has reason to think that circumstances would permit of the defensive attitude being suddenly and unexpectedly turned into a dangerous offensive that he is compelled to devote serious attention to it.

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SECTION 4.
POSSIBILITIES OF A SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE
IN THE MAIN THEATRE OF WAR.

31. Heretofore both the Allies and the Central Powers have sought a decision on one or other of the main fronts. Their efforts have resulted in what is practically a stalemate on those fronts at the present time, but a stalemate which leaves the enemy in possession of large tracts of Allied territory. If he cannot be forced to abandon that territory--particularly (taking the British point of view) Belgium, the integrity of which was an ostensible cause of quarrel--he will hold the trump cards in the eventual peace negotiations. When we seek for new lines of advance, therefore, we really seek them primarily as an indirect means of regaining what has been lost on the East and West fronts, and we look for indirect means only because we have abandoned faith in our ability to drive the enemy back by direct attack, which would clearly be a quicker and more effective method, unless it be impossible.

32. The idea of an easier way round appears to be based more on impatience than on careful examination of evidence.

The General Staff find that our responsible officers in France, who are in close touch with the situation and with the relative "moral" of the opposing armies, are entirely confident in the possibility of defeating the enemy there, if we set about it in the right way.

Our Allies on the East front appear to be fully determined to maintain the struggle to a successful issue, and--given certain procurable requirements--they are capable of throwing far more weight into the scale than they have been able to do for several months past. Italy has no lack of men, and according to the General Staff information her army, too, is able and willing to do more than it has yet done.

The British Empire has not even yet deployed the full strength of which it is capable, nor has it so far applied at a decisive time and place anything like the greatest possible proportion of such strength as is available.

The truth is that by means of adequate preparation on their side and inadequate preparation on ours the enemy gained great advantages at the outset, just as we saw Prussia do in 1866 and Germany in 1870. In those smaller wars the limited resources of Austria and France were insufficient to enable them to recover from their first misfortunes. In this far greater war the resources of the Allies are sufficient to enable them to wear out the enemy and finally to beat him, if only the will to conquer and a sound direction of their united efforts and resources are not wanting.

33. The Allies, up to date, have fought at a grave disadvantage. Partly through unreadiness and partly through lack of that unity of control possessed by the enemy, which saves valuable time and ensures homogeneity and continuity of action, their efforts have been piecemeal, and some of their strength has been dissipated in vain attempts to accomplish secondary objects with inadequate means.

Despite all this they are now attaining to an approximate equilibrium of force, and to a power to employ the whole of it simultaneously, which they did not possess originally. They are capable, if they will, of developing superior force next year, and of using it in a manner which will throw a vastly greater strain on Germany's power of resistance than it has yet been subjected to.

Is Germany capable of resisting that strain?

34. In the full might of her readiness at the outset she tried to rush matters in France, and she nearly succeeded. Her failure lay not in the fact that she was beaten on the Marne, but that she thrust beyond her strength, thereby showing its limitation--and had draw back to recover her balance.

After a winter spent in preparation she next turned on Russia, and the Allies in the west were compelled to look on while she did so. If they could have struck--really hard--at that time Russia would probably have been able at least to hold her own, or Germany by running her defences too fine in the west might have been defeated there.

The next great move was the Allied offensive in the west last autumn, made when Russia was no longer capable of striking on her front. The results of that offensive have caused disappointment. It is not justified. The attack did not attain all that was hoped for. Perhaps it did not accomplish all that it should have accomplished. But it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Allies' past efforts have not been made in vain, and that the relative power of Germany is far less than it was.

Instead of being able to hold one front securely while attacking on the other, as she had done previously, she was compelled by our recent offensive to abandon further attack in the east in order to reinforce on the west, and the reinforcement only enabled her to hold on-not to hit back. She was, in fact, reduced to the defensive, for the first time, on both fronts. It is true that she had a large detachment--possibly 200,000 Austro-Germans--absent in the Balkans. But we, too, had considerable forces absent, and in any case it is in the power of the Allies to counterbalance an addition of far more than 200,000 men to the enemy's forces in the Main Theatre next spring.

35. We had 35 divisions in France during the autumn offensive. It has been shown in a previous section that, if we do all that we are capable of doing, and act on the principle of being as strong as possible at the decisive point even at the cost of grave risks elsewhere, we could employ 59 divisions, or possibly more, in France next year.

The French, we are informed, can maintain through next spring and summer about the same force they had last autumn--2 1/4 millions. To this the Belgians add about 100,000.

Russia, with the munitions already promised, can add at least 700,000 men to her army by next April or May. This alone would more than counterbalance 200,000 Austro-Germans recalled from the Balkans plus the Roumanian Army.

If, by any means, the Allies could increase still further the supply of arms and munitions to Russia, without weakening their own efforts, her resources in men and her readiness to use them are practically unlimited. But even as matters stand it is within the power of the Allies to have greater relative strength against the Central Powers plus Roumania next spring than they had last autumn.

Italy was "containing" at that time only some 250,000 Austrians. The General Staff are informed that she has no lack of men, but is at present short of big guns and big gun ammunition. When she has provided herself with these she may prove capable (especially with the aid of naval co-operation) of forcing the present Austrian defences and so gain more room to deploy. As she can place in the field and maintain there, up to strength, an army of a million men, she could, with more room for deployment, at least contain far more than 250,000 Austrians. Italy's comparative proximity to Buda Pesth and Vienna would ensure the employment of adequate means of defence against her if her advance threatened to succeed, and at the same time a vigorous simultaneous offensive on the East and West fronts would deprive the enemy of the power of turning on Italy and overwhelming her army.

36. How would the Central Powers stand against such a general simultaneous offensive next year? According to calculations, they have almost reached their possible total in quantity and they are deteriorating in quality.

Last autumn, even though Russia was incapable of striking and Italy was tied to her narrow mountainous frontier, we saw Germanys reduced to the defensive on both main fronts, and in the west greater success than was achieved was within, or almost within, our grasp.

The advantage of interior lines, which the enemy has, is lost when he loses his power to throw reserves from side to side at will. When he is "all out" on the defensive, and hard pressed by equal or superior forces, his sting has been drawn and success against him at any one point is likely to be the beginning of disaster. A converging form of attack is more effective than "interior lines," if the converging armies are strong enough to press vigorously and simultaneously everywhere and to maintain the pressure.

37. Judging by last autumn, even if Roumania joins the enemy and if other Balkan detachments help him, is there any reason why, the Allies should not be capable of this pressure next year, if they concentrate now on developing their utmost strength, if they all determine to exert that strength simultaneously against the Austro-Germans, avoid dissipating their strength in secondary theatres and act on a generally accepted plan? Where there is very superior strength and unquestionable unity of control, far-seeing plans of campaign may not be a necessity. But when the instrument available is made up of armies furnished by several independent States, unity of direction would seem to be impossible without such a plan.

38. The history of war teaches that execution of a plan is more important than the plan itself, provided the latter is at least reasonable. It appears to the General Staff that strong, vigorous, simultaneous, and sustained pressure by all the Allies on existing main fronts, as early as possible next spring, is not only a reasonable plan but practically the only one offering any reasonable prospect of defeating the armies of the Central Powers next year. If no effort be spared in preparation, and if the execution be carried out wholeheartedly, the prospects of success are considered at least sufficient to justify the attempt.

39. To carry out this plan whole-heartedly certainly entails accepting some risks outside the Main Theatre, and since we are dealing with a strong, united and determined enemy, even a sound and well executed plan may fail. Should we then be worse off than if we had deprived the plan of its best chance of success by refusing to take any risks? So far as the General Staff are able to judge we should not be worse off. If the Central Powers are entirely victorious in this war they will impose their own terms, which are not likely to err on the side of mercy to the vanquished. If the Allies are victorious over the Central Powers they will then have a free hand to deal with their minor enemies, and but little further effort--if any--would be required to dispose of the latter. The need for further effort would of course be distasteful, but surely it is worth facing the possibility in order to gain the greatest--indeed we believe practically the only-chance of reaping all the advantages that such a victory as the defeat of the Central Powers would give.

40. We must play either for checkmate or for stalemate. If we determine to play for the latter the General Staff see no prospect of depriving the enemy, by force, of what he now holds, as we should have to concentrate our efforts, not on defeating him, but on defending from him what he has not yet gained. In such a contest the advantages would rest with him.

41. As has already been explained, so long as the Allies stand on the defensive, the enemy can utilize the advantages of his interior lines and more rapid means of communication. By means thereof he can force the Allies to hold so much of their strength to guard their own borders that their power of offence--and even of defence in other theatres is very limited. This would leave him free, not only to strike when and where he pleased, but to intrigue with and encourage, and even to give material help to, our potential enemies in the Near and Far East, and, if the war be long drawn out, he may stir up more trouble than we should be able to cope with.

42. There is, however, one possible alternative left to consider the possibility that financial ruin, or discontent arising out of shortage of food and other hardships, may compel the enemy to give way. It may be, in fact, that we have the option of compelling surrender by investment instead of carrying the fortress by assault. If so, and if we are to decide in favour of the former, we must make our dispositions accordingly.

The possibility of ultimate victory by investment depends mainly on the power of the Allies to make the investment complete, to outstay the enemy financially, and to deprive him of the food or other supplies necessary for the maintenance of his resistance.

This again depends partly on naval and military, and partly on financial and other considerations. As regards the latter the General Staff are not competent judges, but so far as they have been able to study evidence on the subject they do not regard the prospect as encouraging. The Germans are a brave race, capable of much endurance, and subservient to a control which is not lacking in determination. The reduction of such a garrison by investment is likely to be a long and wearying process, and such processes are a particularly severe test of the strength of the bonds of an alliance.

From the naval and military point of view, making due allowance for the need to consider the interests of neutral States, it is very doubtful whether the investment could be made effective, and if it is to be made as effective as possible it would not be within the power of the Allies to carry on a strong general offensive at the same time, since so many troops would have to be disposed defensively to complete the investment line.

43. It seems that some of the measures recently attempted in the Mediterranean had some idea of investment underlying them; and, no doubt, if the Allies could have brought the Balkan States over to their side, or kept them strictly neutral, a fairly complete investment might have been maintained. But it is too late for that now. For reasons already given we must regain our position in the Balkan States through Germany, and not vice versa. Therefore, now, our investment line would have to include these States within it--a task beyond our means. Moreover, the Central Powers will have re-provisioned themselves to some extent from the Balkans.

It seems, therefore that there is insufficient ground for hope that the misery and privation in Germany will be great enough to force her to surrender so long as her people continue to believe in ultimate victory. As regards her supply of men, a policy of investment would enable her to economize her last reserves, and there is no sufficient evidence to show that, in that case, she could not protract the war for a very long time. Above all nations she believes in force, and it is only to force that she will give in.

But nevertheless the Allies may get help, and great help, from Germany's privations. Her people are enduring much to win. How would it affect them if the hope of winning died--if the belief in the invincibility of their armies were shattered?

The Germans are capable of giving way to utter panic. This was proved more than once in 1870. The "moral" of their men is deteriorating. We are in a position, with plenty of munitions, to try it far more severely this winter than last winter.

Next spring and summer such an effort by the Allies as has been suggested in the foregoing pages stands at least a fair chance of pushing back the enemy's armies. They may break badly. Even if they do not, the spectacle of the armies in retreat over, or even towards, their own borders, after all their struggles, and hopes, and privations, might well prove to be more than the German and Austrian people could bear.

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SECTION 5
CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE
BEST COURSE OF ACTION
FOR THE ALLIES.

44. The defeat of the Austro-German armies on the existing main fronts is undoubtedly a most difficult task, but there are no sufficient grounds for concluding that it is not possible to accomplish it if the Allies set about it in the right way.

45. The hope--born of the difficulties of gaining a victory on the existing main fronts--that the Allies can find an easier way to victory over the Austro-German armies by opening a new main line of advance, has no justification in fact. Any attempt to open such a new main line of advance would place the Allies at a grave disadvantage during the months that would be required to develop the operation, and even the successful opening of such a new line of advance, far from placing the Allies in a better position, would merely open to the enemy greater opportunities of making advantageous use of his interior lines of operation and superior means of communication.

46. In short, the choice open to the Allies does not lie between different lines of offence, but between what may be described as assault or investment.

If the Balkan States had joined the Entente, or remained strictly neutral, effective investment would have been easier to accomplish than it is now. As matters stand, however, the position secured by the Central Powers in the Balkan States places them in a stronger position as regards supplies of food and certain other requirements, and also, perhaps, in some degree as regards reserves of men. It was not possible to prevent by force this advantage falling into the enemy's hands owing to his superior and interior means of communication, and to the inability of the Allies to develop their full fighting strength with sufficient rapidity. The attempt to foil the enemy plans with inadequate means has proved costly and may become more so if continued. Neither is it possible now to win back control of the Balkan States by force of arms, as any attempt to do so would place the Allies at a grave disadvantage as against the Central Powers during, probably, the whole of the next year, and would entail, so far as can be foreseen, the employment for that time of a considerable part of the Allied forces against the Balkan Allies of the Central Powers rather than against the armies of those powers. As it is very unlikely that the Balkan States would send any large forces (except possibly 300,000 to 400,000 men into Bessarabia, if Roumania joins the Central Powers), the Allies can to a great extent avoid having to fight the armies of these States by avoiding the Balkan theatre of war. In the circumstances it is undoubtedly wiser to avoid it. Therefore, if investment is the method to be relied on, the line of investment should run outside the Balkans; and if an offensive is to be prosecuted it has far greater chances of success on the existing main fronts than through the Balkans.

47. Existing and--so far as can be foreseen--probable future conditions are not favourable to success by investment, and, at the best, it is almost certain that it would take a long time to reduce the enemy to submission by such means. On the other hand, so far as the information at their disposal goes the General Staff consider that a vigorous, sustained, simultaneous, general offensive offers better prospects of success than any other course open to the Allies.

48. Accordingly the General Staff recommend, unhesitatingly, a vigorous prosecution of the offensive on the existing East and West and Italian fronts as the wisest course to pursue.

There are no certainties in war, and it cannot be guaranteed that the course recommended would succeed, but the General Staff feel convinced that there is no alternative worth adopting, and that the prospects of success, and perhaps decisive success, for such an offensive are good if all the Allies agree on it, prepare for it without delay and to the utmost of their several and collective abilities, and carry it through wholeheartedly and with the utmost vigour. By so much as any of the Allies falls short of developing his full power of preparation and execution by so much will the chance of success be reduced.

If the course the General Staff recommend is to be adopted, the naval, military and diplomatic measures to be taken from now onwards by all the Allies should be combined towards ensuring the greatest possible chance of success for the proposed offensive. Every step taken in future should lead towards that end. Preparations should commence now and the British Empire should spare no effort to develop its fullest strength without a moment's delay and to do all that it can to help its Allies to develop theirs.

If all this be done without stint the General Staff have every hope of a victorious ending to the war.

The alternative to the offensive recommended is not the discovery of some easier road to success but failure to attain a victory which is almost certainly within the power of the Entente if it be true to itself and to the cause it champions.

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SECTION 6
OUTLINE OF THE PLAN
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL STAFF
FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

The utmost concentration of effort at the time and place chosen for a decision cannot be ensured without reducing to a minimum all commitments elsewhere which would be likely to weaken the main offensive. Therefore the Allies must be prepared to accept risks outside the main theatre, and in cases where it is judged impossible to leave important interests entirely unguarded efforts must be regulated by the ruling strategical principle of being as strong as possible at the decisive place and time ; that is to say it will generally be necessary in all secondary theatres which cannot be entirely ignored that the military and diplomatic measures taken should be designed to gaining time and safeguarding our interests with a minimum expenditure of force, rather than to forcing an issue. The only possible exception to this would be in cases, should any exist, where it is possible by vigorous measures to dispose of threatening dangers so quickly that the troops employed could then be withdrawn to France by the early Spring. Transport possibilities constitute an important factor in the problem.

To apply the principles stated in the preceding paragraph the General Staff are of opinion that it would be most advantageous to be relieved of our present commitments in the Balkan Theatre. If there were good reason to suppose that the Central Powers are on the verge of collapse then it would possibly be unwise to loose our hold anywhere. But there is no sufficient evidence to justify that belief, and the General Staff are convinced that no military or political object, sufficient to justify the expenditure of force involved, can be obtained in the Balkans with the forces available, while a continuance of the operations there will undoubtedly weaken future offensive operations m the main theatre to an extent which will seriously prejudice our hopes of success there. We require every man we can find to break the enemy's resistance in that theatre.

Egypt and the Suez Canal no doubt must be defended, and we might aim there either at merely repulsing the Turkish attacks until want of water in the Spring forces them to withdraw, or at being strong enough to defeat the first attacks so heavily as to drive the enemy off at once and so release our forces to return to France. For the former eight divisions should suffice. Strong arguments against the latter alternative are the impossibility of following up a beaten enemy to any distance into the desert, the limitations of our power to transport troops rapidly by sea (especially while Salonika and the Dardanelles absorb so much of our means of transport) and the inadvisability of running too fine our defences in France, where a renewal of German attacks is by no means improbable, and where, even if our own front be secure, there may be need to assist our Allies.

In case it is necessary to extricate the force now operating in Mesopotamia with Indian troops, India may have to be reinforced by some infantry. Our aim there, military and diplomatic, must be to gain time. Probably less expenditure of force would be involved in maintaining a sufficient garrison in India to hold it than in undertaking operations towards Baghdad in the hope of thereby preventing or delaying Mahometan outbreaks. A choice between these alternatives would seem worth further discussion with the Government of India, but it must be on the basis that the most urgent need is to be as strong as possible in France.

The withdrawal at the earliest moment of divisions from Egypt, and , if possible, from India also, must constantly be held in mend. It should be feasible to employ several, if not all, of them in France by next summer at the latest if every effort is made to do so and unavoidable risks are accepted.

The views of the General Staff as to East Africa have been submitted on a separate paper, and a decision as to the action to be taken there during the next few months has been given by the War Council. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the problem in this paper.

As regards preparation during the winter, it is of vital importance that the British Empire should exert its utmost efforts to develop its full powers in men and munitions in readiness for the great offensive.

There is no time to raise and equip further new armies, but we should as a nation do all in our power to bring all existing cadres up to full strength, in all respects, without delay ; and if we can add another division or two so much the better. It is equally necessary to provide without delay for replacing all wastage in these divisions, even on a scale beyond all previous experience, by having the necessary drafts on the spot in anticipation.

The ruling principle must be to place every possible division fully manned and equipped in all respects-in France next spring.

With due regard to Home Defence requirements while we are on the defensive in France, and to unavoidable defensive measures in India and Egypt, we should maintain ample forces in France during the winter, so that the men may have frequent reliefs and as much leave as possible in order to keep them healthy and in good heart. Ample strength at home and in France will obviate much anxiety and will enable us to take steps to wear down the enemy's " moral " during the winter in a way that was not possible last winter. As far as possible new divisions should be sent to France in turn during the winter, in order that they may become accustomed to the conditions there.

As a really strong offensive in France may be expected to make it practically impossible for the enemy to detach any large force to attempt a landing in England, the divisions in garrison in England, or most of them, should be thrown into the offensive in France when it begins. Therefore, they should be fit to take part in that offensive.

After providing for our own needs, we should do what we can to assist the Russians to arm the numbers they have available.

The actual plan of attack in spring must be left to the commanders in the field, who should be given as soon as possible all information necessary to enable them to prepare for it. The date should be arranged between the Governments concerned. The General Staff, however, if it be permissible to offer any suggestions to our Allies, would venture to submit two, viz. : --

(i.) If Russia be attacked by, or through, Roumania, it would fit in best with the general offensive proposed if she relied on defensive delaying action in Bessarabia and brought her main weight to bear as directly as possible further north.

(ii.) If Italy could use her surplus numbers (combined if possible with Serbs and Montenegrins) in an oversea operation, either through the Istrian peninsula or in the near neighbourhood of it, it would (if such an operation be possible) be likely to help her main advance and to result in larger Austrian forces being drawn to that front. Any such effort should be timed so that its effect would synchronise with the general offensive elsewhere.

So far as the difficulty of protecting the transport of troops across the Adriatic goes, our Navy could probably give considerable help to Italy if the present strain on it were reduced by the abandonment of Salonika.

In this regard the General Staff desire to submit a point for special consideration.

The sea power of Great Britain is one of the most important factors in this war. Without it there could be no British Army in France to-day. It is not only an essential condition of any overseas expedition, but the security of the seas and of Great Britain herself may be affected prejudicially by such expeditions if they involve too great a dispersion of naval effort. Further, our unique facilities for sea transport, and our unrivalled experience in this respect, make us in such matters the predominant partner in the Alliance. It is surely not too much, therefore, to expect that in any consideration of expeditions involving a heavy call on our sea power and means of sea transport, the views of this country as to what should or should not be attempted should carry special weight.

The possibilities of action open to the Central Powers will be affected by the measures taken by the Allies. If the latter carry out a really strong offensive on the lines proposed, the Central Powers will certainly be compelled to use all their force to resist it. But in accordance with their usual custom it is most probable that they will endeavour to anticipate it. Success against Italy would be of comparatively minor value to Germany at the present juncture. Austria may desire it, but Germany is likely to regard it more impartially and to rank other projects as of more immediate value. It is therefore far more likely that the enemy will take in hand an offensive against Russia or France, if not against England also.

An offensive against France would, if successful, give far more immediate results than an attack on Russia, especially if the Allied forces there are seriously weakened for operations elsewhere. On the other hand, Russia is perhaps the enemy that Germany dreads most in the future, and with the help of Roumania (if obtainable) and perhaps of Turkey, she may regard success against Russia as more easily attainable in the Spring.

The enemy may, therefore, select either France or Russia as his main objective. In either case, strength in France will be of equal advantage to all the Allies. It would enable us to beat off attack there and to counter-attack, while a strong attack by the Allies in France would be the best and quickest way to draw pressure off Russia.

The most probable action by the Central Powers then is :

To hold the Italian frontier defensively. .

To use Turkish troops and every other means possible, short of employing German troops in any appreciable numbers, to induce England to detach as much as possible to the East.

To utilise (if possible) Roumanian troops and also, so far as may be possible, Turkish troops against Southern Russia. The Bulgars word probably be unwilling to fight the Russians, otherwise they might be invited to join too.

Then to mass as strong a force as possible for an offensive either against France or Russia timed to anticipate the Allies' offensive.

The possibility of a landing in England will be held in view constantly.

It is very unlikely that Germany will detach any considerable part of her own forces to any great distance from the main theatre of war.

If this forecast is correct, the advantages of the dispositions recommended above for the Allied forces are evident.

The only other main courses open to the enemy are to content himself with holding what he has got, stand on the defensive, and endeavour to " outstay " us ; or to enter on a career of conquest in the East. If he adopts the latter course, such an offensive as has been recommended will undoubtedly force him to recall his troops at once, and the Allies will reap all the benefit of having forced him to change his plans. If he should choose the former course, which would be contrary to all his principles of war, the Allies must either defeat him on one or other of his main fronts, or organize some slow and indirect new line of advance, the disadvantages of which have been pointed out in the preceding pages, or sit down to a trial of endurance.

The General Staff can see no reasonable doubt that the wisest course in any of these circumstances is the offensive they have recommended.

For that offensive it is within the power of the Allies, if they will, to bring to bear and to maintain on the three main fronts at least 6 1/2 millions of men, viz. :

France and Belgium, over The British Empire, over Russia, over

Italy ..

And if her munition difficulties can be solved Russia can provide a much larger force.

Against these numbers the Central Powers, even with considerable help from the Balkan States, are unlikely to be able to maintain on the three main fronts more than from 5 to 51 millions.

With such odds in favour of the Allies if they all combine immediately in preparation, and with a wise concentration of effort at the decisive time and place, it is surely reasonable to claim that the prospects of success are encouraging.

16th December, 1915.

A. J. MURRAY, Lieut.-General, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

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* As regards this last-mentioned force, it must be noted that if the divisions cannot be maintained at least at their present strength, and if we stand on the defensive in France, much more than four Regular division should be allotted for home defence.